Notice: Ads help support our website operation, if you would like to turn them OFF for this visit;
AIR OPERATION COMMITTEE
Hickam Field, T.H
1 March 1941
Subject: Minority Report, Air Operations Committee
To: Planning Representatives, Joint Coastal Frontier Defense Committee
1. The partial report of the air operations committee convened in compliance with joint directive dated 14 February 1941. G-A16-1/A7-3 (2)/1ND14 (0135), draft copy attached, is predicated on a principle to which as the Air Corps member of that committee I cannot subscribe, hence this report of disagreement therewith.
2. The majority of the members of the air command committee believe that joint air operations in defense of objectives in the Hawaiian area can be most effectively accomplished if conducted under the principle it enunciated in paragraphs 9b (3) and 10 of “Joint Action of the Army and Navy”, i.e. “The Exercise of Unity of Command”.
3. In this viewpoint I cannot concur. Paragraph eight of the above reference prescribes 2 methods of coordinating the operations of the forces of the Army and the Navy; i.e., “Mutual Cooperation”, and “The Exercise of Unity of Command”. Further paragraph 9s of the same reference states that “Mutual Cooperation” will be the method normally employed in coordinating the operations of these forces. After full consideration of the points brought out in the committee discussion of the world situation and particularly as to the implications involving the defense of Hawaii in this connection, I have failed to grasp the cogency of the hypotheses that the exercise of “Unity of Command”, is the proper panacea for the control of joint air operations of the Army and the Navy in this area. On the contrary it is believed that with the present status of our equipment and training, and the probability of wide differences in the situations which may confront the two services in the defense of vital naval and military elements in the Hawaiian area indicates “Mutual Cooperation” as the most comprehensive principle under which to attack the basic problems of defense.
This principle provides A logical and legal basis for operating agreements between the commanders of the respective services upon which to base specific plans for the joint employment of their air components. Experience in the joint air operations in the last few years will testify to its efficacy as a method of coordination.
The constituent elements of the Army and Navy air components are each equipped and trained to most the requirements of a specific type of military or naval operation. These requirements have conditioned the powers and limitations of both personnel and equipment in each case. Although there exists a similarity between the air units of the two services in this respect, this similarity in no sense approaches true homogeneity.
Efficiency and flexibility in the military operations of our available air forces can only be preserved when the true respective elements thereof are employed in such a way as to utilize their maximum powers in any given situation. If this thesis is accepted it is inherent that the authority of the Army and Navy commanders to exercise control over their own air components, must at all times be reserved, until in the face of a specific and clear situation indicating the necessity or desirability therefore, under the principle of “Mutual Cooperation”, they agree to place all or part of their respective air components under the control of one service for a joint operation.
I can perceive no valid obstruction to the most effective employment of the air components of the two services in the Hawaiian area under this principle. The vesting of responsibility, and concurrently, command, in either of the two services for specific operations in any given situation, is in no way impeded, the judgment and purpose of the responsible commanders, inferentially or otherwise, is never impugned, and the morals of aviation personnel can be maintained on a psychologically healthy basis.
In disagreeing with the report of the air command committee I wish to make it clear that I heartily concur in the objectives sought in the recommendations therein although I cannot agree with the method recommended for their attainment.
Accordingly it is recommended that the partial report of the committee on air command, submitted under date of 25 February 1941, copy attached, be amended to accomplish the objectives sought therein under the principle of “Mutual Cooperation” as follows:
Par. 2 (a) No Change.
Par. 2 (b) Delete: “That joint air operations in defense of vital military and naval elements in the Hawaiian area will be most efficiently accomplished if planning and preparation therefore are conducted in accordance with par. 8 (a) reference (b) i.e., “Mutual Cooperation”.”
Par. 2 (d) Add the following: However, agreements for joint air command must be predicated upon a situation sufficiently clear to indicate its effect on the relative responsibilities of the respective commanders which will determine the extent and period for which each might properly divest himself of the means provided for the discharge of his respective responsibilities.
Par. 2 (e) No Change
Par. 3 Delete and substitute therefor the following: “It is therefore recommended that the Army and Navy commanders in the Hawaiian area agree to be guided by the following provisions”.
Par. 3 (a) & (b) No Change.
Par. 3 (c) After “operating” in first line, insert “at sea”.
Par. 3 (d) No change.
Par. 3 (e) Delete.
Par. 3 (f) No change.
Par. 3 (g) Note changed to read: “Two Army representatives should be assigned to the Office of the Commandant 14th Naval District, one an Air Corps officer, and one Coast Artillery Officer, who should be selected with specific reference to his knowledge of anti-aircraft weapons.
Par. 3 (h) No change.
ST. CLAIR STREETT,Lieut. Col., Air Corps, Air Corps Representative, Air Command Committee.
1 Incl – Report of Air Operations Committee.
Q1: Who wrote this March 1, 1941 report?
A1: Lieutenant Colonel St. Clair Streett, the Air Corps representative on the Air Command Committee at Hickam Field, Hawaii, wrote this minority dissenting report.
Q2: What was this report responding to?
A2: It responds to the majority report of the Air Operations Committee, convened under a joint Army-Navy directive dated February 14, 1941, to plan joint air defense of the Hawaiian area.
Q3: What is the difference between "Unity of Command" and "Mutual Cooperation"?
A3: "Unity of Command" placed one commander in overall control of joint Army-Navy air operations, while "Mutual Cooperation" allowed each service to retain control of its own air components under negotiated agreements.
Q4: Which principle did Lt. Col. Streett recommend for Hawaiian air defense?
A4: Streett argued for "Mutual Cooperation" rather than "Unity of Command," believing it better preserved each service's authority over forces suited to their specific operational strengths.
Q5: Why is this document historically significant?
A5: Written just over nine months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, this report documents pre-war debates over Army-Navy command coordination in Hawaii that later drew scrutiny amid investigations into the attack's intelligence and command failures.
This page hosts a formal internal dissent from Lieutenant Colonel St. Clair Streett, the Air Corps representative on the Air Command Committee at Hickam Field, Territory of Hawaii, dated March 1, 1941.
What the document is
The Air Operations Committee, convened under a joint Army-Navy directive issued February 14, 1941, had produced a partial majority report recommending that joint air operations in defense of Hawaii be conducted under the principle of "Unity of Command" — a single officer holding overall authority over both services' air components during a given operation. Streett declined to sign that report and instead filed this minority position, arguing the committee should adopt "Mutual Cooperation" instead, meaning each service would retain command over its own air units, coordinating through negotiated agreements rather than subordinating one service's aircraft to a commander from the other.
The substance of his argument
Streett grounds his objection in existing Army-Navy doctrine. He cites "Joint Action of the Army and Navy," which stated that Mutual Cooperation was the normal method for coordinating the two services, with Unity of Command reserved only for situations that clearly called for it. His practical concern is that Army and Navy air units were each equipped and trained for distinct missions, and that this specialization "in no sense approaches true homogeneity" — meaning a single joint commander might not be positioned to employ each service's aircraft according to their actual strengths. He also raises morale as a factor, arguing that Mutual Cooperation would better preserve "the judgment and purpose of the responsible commanders" without impugning either service's authority.
Notably, Streett is careful to distinguish means from ends. He states plainly that he agrees with the objectives the majority report was trying to achieve — effective, coordinated joint air defense of Hawaii — and disputes only the organizational mechanism for getting there. The bulk of the document is then a line-by-line set of proposed amendments to the majority report, replacing references to Unity of Command with Mutual Cooperation and specifying that any transfer of command authority between the services should only occur when a situation is "sufficiently clear" to justify it. He also proposes a small but specific staffing change: assigning two Army officers, one from the Air Corps and one from Coast Artillery with anti-aircraft expertise, to the Commandant of the 14th Naval District's office to improve coordination.
Historical character of the document
Read on its own terms, this is a piece of institutional process — a professional officer exercising his prerogative to dissent from a committee recommendation and putting that dissent formally on the record, with specific, actionable proposed edits rather than a vague objection. It reflects the kind of careful, deliberate staff work that went into working out Army-Navy command relationships in the Hawaiian theater in the months before American entry into the war. Streett's tone is measured and collegial throughout — he repeatedly affirms respect for the majority's goals even as he argues for a different path to reach them, which is characteristic of formal staff correspondence of this era.
As a standalone artifact, it offers a window into how mid-level commanders in early 1941 were actively reasoning through the tradeoffs between centralized and decentralized command of joint air assets, at a time when doctrine for this kind of coordination was still being worked out in real time on the ground in Hawaii.
Do you have WWII memorabilia that you are not sure what to do with it? The children don't want it? Then let us help you preserve this history by donating these items to the Army Air Corps Library and Museum. We are accepting donations in the form of uniforms, medals, ribbons, patches, photos, memorabilia, papers, gear and equipment. We also accept monetary donations to support our operations and long term plans. This website is part of the Army Air Corps Library and Museum, and as a 501(c)(3) Non-profit, your qualifying donations are tax deductible.
Read about how we need your support and use donations.
Historical Artifacts: We are looking for photos, documents and other types of artifacts including uniforms, medals, insignia, gear, manuals, and training material. We accept electronic/scans or originals of pictures and paper records. A General Order could be an award document that contains information on many servicemen. Special Orders may contain transfers or other information. Flight records, accident reports, maintenance logs, after action reports, pilot encounter reports, diaries and biorgraphies; all of these types of documents help us support or mission: preserving your history! Contact us today for instructions on sending us this material. Contact Today
Are you an AAC, AAF or USAF Veteran, family member, historian or WW2 enthusiast? We Need YOU! Contact us today to see how you can help the Army Air Corps Library and Museum, a Texas Not-For-Profit Corporation. We need your help! We are looking for volunteers that can help us with the following tasks. Typing and Transcriptionists: One of our big projects is extracting data from the thousands of documents we have and putting this data into a database where we can display the information on a website such as this one. We also need assistance with retyping unit history documents.
